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In an economy characterized by stable growth and low 
inflation. the slope of a non-linear Phillips curve may become 
flatter. As a result, the degree of sacrifice of employment needed 
to reduce the inflation rate increases. Therefore, it is necessary 
to carry out inflation targeting monetary policy more flexibly 
including a careful reexamination of both the target inflation 
rate to restore economic growth toward full employment and of 
the appropriate level of interest rate to achieve the target 
inflation rate. The costs of reducing inflation as well as the 
benefits of doing so should be taken into account together in a 
balanced manner. An optimal target rate of inflation becomes 
more important in escaping from unnecessary unemployment. 
In this regard, the form of the Phillips curve has important 
implications for monetary policy. In Korea. a non-linear Phillips 
curve is estimated to be concave. The estimated full employment 
rate of inflation (FERI) is still within the upper bound of the 
band of the current target inflation rate and, according to the 
simulation result, the level of the current rate of interest seems 
reasonable. Statistically, however, the output gap is only 
insignificantly influenced by a change in the interest rate mainly 
because the demand elasticity of interest rate had been almost 
negligible since the 1997 financial crisis. Therefore, recovering 
the investment elasticity of interest rates has now emerged as 
an important issue. 
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I. Introduction 
An inflation targeting regime as a new monetary policy implemen- 
tation system has been adopted in many countries since the 1990s. 
Korea also adopted it in 1998 just after the occurring of the 1997 
financial crisis. This new trend reflects world-wide high inflation in 
the 1980s. Experiencing high inflation made us realize the importance 
and benefits of low inflation. 
In particular, it is emphasized that the lowering of inflation 
expectations enhances efficiency of monetary policy in the sense that 
a s  inflation expectations decrease, inflation could be contatned with a 
smaller increase in the interest rate, that is, smaller sacrifice of 
employment. It is also argued that credibility of monetary policy is 
crucial to reduce inflation expectations, and that it is necessary to 
announce a nominal anchor of monetary policy and to keep It to 
strengthen credibility of monetary policy. An inflation targeting regime 
as  a new monetary policy implementation system has emerged on 
such backgrounds. A nominal anchor of monetary policy is a target 
inflation rate. 
Since the late 1990s. however, inflation rates have fallen 
considerably. In some countries, economic growth rates have also 
declined. In consequence, interest rates have decreased as  well. Low 
growth, low inflation and low interest rates have gone coupled since 
the late 1990s. These economies, which previously experienced rapid 
growth, may be termed stably growing economies. 
In such an economy, the Phillips curve may become flatter, and, a s  
a result, a degree of sacrifice of employment to reduce an inflation 
rate could increase. Therefore the form of the Phillips curve has 
important implications for monetary policy. Accordingly, in recent 
years, studies on the optimal monetary policy based on the 
nonlinearity of the Phillips curve have become popular as inflation 
rates decrease (Akerlof et al. 1996: Laxton et al. 1999: Nobay and Peel 
2000; Dolado et al. 2005). They argue that the nonlinearity of the 
Phillips curve has influenced monetary policy through a Taylor-type 
monetary policy rule including a term reflecting the nonlinearity. 
In these circumstances, the costs of reducing inflation as well as 
the benefit of doing so should be considered together in a balanced 
way, in contrast to the high inflation period when the benefits of 
reducing inflation were more strongly emphasized. In this regard, 
some authors have Med to search for an optimal point on the 
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trade-off relationship between the inflation rate and the growth rate 
(an un-unemployment pace) (Akerlof et al. 1996; Fuhrer 1997). Others 
have put forward the concept of the optimal target rate of inflation 
(Thornton 1996). A number have argued that policy attempts to 
reduce inflation volatility increase output volatility greatly (Fuhrer 
1997; Cecchetti and Ehrmann 1999), which some have stressed the 
importance of the credibility of monetary policy in an era of price 
stability since enhanced credibility improves the inflation-unemploy- 
ment trade-off and thus can reduce inflation with a smaller rise in 
unemployment (Svensson 2000; Clifton et al. 2001). In short, in a 
stable growth environment. the costs of reducing inflation as well as 
its benefits should be taken into account together, and then the 
optimal target rate of inflation becomes more important to escape 
from unnecessary unemployment. 
In the case of a negative output gap, that is, where actual output is 
less than potential output, the recovery of output should be taken 
into account in monetary policy implementation as well as main- 
taining inflation a t  a stable level. That is to say a flexible inflation 
targeting regime. In consequence, the monetary authority tends to 
move its policy emphasis more toward economic growth, and 
increasing the weight on economic growth calls for lower interest 
rates. However, in such an economy, interest rates are already low, 
and, therefore, the scope for lowering them further is likely to be 
limited. Strikingly, in such a case where the investment elasticity of 
interest rate is low, the effectiveness of monetary policy might be 
reduced. A change in the degree of sacrifice of employment needed to 
reduce the inflation rate and its influence on monetary policy can be 
more effectively examined with a nonlinear Phillips curve rather than 
a conventional linear Phillips curve. 
The Korean economy experienced a severe structural break during 
the 1997 financial crisis. On average, GDP growth rate declined 
substantially from 8.4 percent during the pre-crisis period, from the 
1st quarter in 1982 to the 2nd quarter of 1997, to stand at 4.5 
percent during the post-crisis period running from the 4th quarter of 
2000 to the 2nd quarter of 2005. Inflation rates also declined. The 
core inflation rate fell from 5.0 percent during the pre-crisis period 
(from the 3rd quarter of 1982 to the 4th quarter of 1997) to 3.1 
percent during the post-crisis period (from the 4th quarter of 2000 to 
the 2nd quarter of 2005). As a consequence, nominal interest rates 
also declined considerably. The call rate declined from 12 percent to 4 
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percent during the same period. The characteristic phenomenon of 
simultaneous low growth. low inflation. and low interest rate was 
observed after the crisis. In recent years, even a negative output gap 
has  opened up  (see Appendix Figure 1). Accordingly, to avoid un- 
necessary unemployment, the costs of reducing inflation a s  well as its 
benefits, and then optimal target rate of inflation should be carefully 
reexamined. 
In the following section 11, a new Keynesian model with a 
nonlinear Phillips curve will be examjned. A new Keynesian model 
popularly employed in recent years for analysis of inflation targeting 
(Clarida et al. 1999: Blanchard and Cali 2005) will be combined 
with the nonlinear Phillips curve. In section 111, empirical analysis 
will be carried out to scrutinize how the nonlinear-Phillips curve 
has changed after the crisis, and how such change in this 
particular nonlinear Phillips curve has influenced monetary policy. 
We then search for an optimal level of the target inflation rate to 
reflect changed economic circumstances. Finally, a summary and 
some conclusions are set out in section IV. 
11. New Keynesian Model with a Nonlinear Phillips Curve 
A. Nonlinear Phillips Curve 
Generally, an  economy that is growing stably at  below its potential 
growth with a low inflation rate. a non-linear Phillips curve may 
become flatter, than in its high growth period, and, a s  a result, the 
degree of sacrifice of employment needed to reduce the inflation rate 
may increase (see Figure 1). 
In this economy, the question of what represents an appropriate 
level of the target inflation rate to restore economic growth toward a 
full employment path or, a t  least, to escape from unnecessary 
unemployment naturally becomes an important issue. The inflation 
rate accompanying full employment could be termed, the Full 
Employment Rate of inflation (I;%RIl. Here full employment does not 
necessarily mean that labor supplies are completely employed and 
thus the unemployment rate is zero. In fact, statistically, full 
employment Is not regarded a s  zero unemployment. 
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Inflation Rate 
In a nonlinear Phillips curve, as the unemployment rate decreases 
beyond a certain point, the inflation rate begins to increase at an 
accelerating rate. This point at which unemployment rate is a t  a 
minimum without an accelerating increase of the inflation rate may 
be regarded as full employment. In that sense, the Non-Accelerating 
Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU) is this kind of full employ- 
ment. Conversely, in a nonlinear Phillips curve, as the inflation rate 
decreases beyond a certain point, the unemployment rate begins to 
increase a t  an accelerating rate. This point of minimum inflation rate 
without an  accelerating increase of unemployment rate may be called 
the Non-Accelerating Unemployment Rate of Inflation (NAURI). FEN is 
almost the same concept as NAURI. For the U.S.A., NAIRU and 
NAURI are estimated as 5.9 percent and 3.0 percent respectively 
(Akerlof et al. 1996). For Korea, NAIRU was estimated as 3.2-3.7 
percent in 2003 (Shin 2004) and NAURI at 2.9-3.1 percent (Lee 2002). 
As  NAIRU was often used as a guideline for growth in a high 
growth, in high inflation economy, FERI (or NAURI) could be a 
candidate as  a guideline of target inflation rate in a stably growing 
and low inflation economy. 
B. New Keynesian Model with a Nonlinear Phillips Curve 
It  follows from this argument that the monetary authority tends to 
move its policy weight more toward economic growth in a flexible 
inflation targeting system, that is, in its policy objective function, il 
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Volatlllty 
of Output , ( n = o  
I 1 so-...,., %a= Volatility of 
VL* Inflation 
tends to rise. 
where 7 ~ .  is the inflation rate, n* is the target inflation rate, y is the 
output (in general, GDP) gap rate, and A is a policy weight between 
the inflation gap and output gap rate.) As A rises, volatility of output 
tends to decrease, while volatility of inflation tends to increase (see 
Figure 2). 
In short, in a stably growing economy, growing, in general, below 
its potential growth accompanied by a low inflation rate, a rise in the 
sacrifice ratio and as a result, a change in policy stance of the 
monetary authority in favor of greater economic growth are inclined to 
take place. We can see with the recently popular new Keynesian 
model how much such changes influence monetary policy. 
The new Keynesian model is composed of a central bank's 
quadratic loss function in inflation and output performance, a 
Phillips curve (or AS schedule), an IS schedule (or AD schedule). 
and a central bank's policy reaction function derived from the 
above three functions (Clarida et al. 1999; Blanchard and Gall 
2005). 
In every period, the central bank sets the nominal short-term 
interest rate, i, aiming at maintaining the inflation gap, n- IF*, and 
output gap rate, y, close to zero. Assuming a quadratic per-period 
loss function in inflation and output performance, 
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1 ~ ( n !  - n*, ytl = ?[(XI- n*12+ AY:I (11 
and a fixed discount rate. 6, the central bank's objective in period 
t is to minimize the expected present discounted value of the 
per-period losses: 
subject to the following Phillips curve and IS schedule. 
The Phillips curve is as follows: 
to reflect the non-linearity of the Phillips curve (Dolado et al. 
2005). 
Therefore the non-linear Phillips curve can be expressed as 
follows: 
An output gap rate is closely related with an unemployment rate, u, 
and therefore the non-linear Phillips curve can be expressed in terms 
of an unemployment rate as follows: 
Next, the IS schedule is as follows: 
Where Et is conditional expectations operator, 6 and PEIO, 11, and 
u,,t and u,.t are zero-mean normally distributed shocks. 
Here, in particular, in Equation (3) of the Phillips curve, an output 
gap rate enters in a nonlinear way, as defined in Equation (4). 
Linearity in (41 is recovered when @=O and the function is convex 
(concave) if @>0(@<0).  We assume the function to be increasing (1 + 
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24y>0). Equation (7) is an IS schedule where the output gap rate 
exhibits sluggish adjustment, and depends on the real interest rate, 
and on a predetermined/exogenous variables, XI ,  for instance. a 
foreign interest rate or an exchange rate reflecting the openness of the 
economy. The real interest rate affects output with a one-period lag 
and therefore affects inflation with a two-period lag. These time lags 
reflect the transmission mechanism of monetary policy where mone- 
tary policy leads to a change in output in the short run while a 
change in inflation, due to a change in aggregate demand, follows 
later. 
Totally differentiating (2) with respect to i, subject to (5) and (7). 
ylelds the following Taylor rule: 
where c 1 = 1 +  alil4P. cz=( l+  6p2)/64p, c3= r715, c4=2@a/ilfP. 
Replacing the expectations by realized values in Equation (9) yields 
the following central bank's policy reaction function to be used for 
estimation: 
where k is positive, taking into account the time lags of monetary 
policy transmission and the central bank's pre-emptive policy 
Implementation, and a lagged dependent variable, i f -  I is included to 
reflect interest rate smoothing. 
An error term is defined as  follows: 
where the term in brackets is a linear combination of forecast 
errors and therefore orthogonal to any variable in the information set 
at t-1. 
The policy reaction function, Equation (10) Is slightly changed, 
following Clarida et al. (2000) and Apergis et al. (2005), to the 
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following forward-looking rule, Equation (1 1) for estimation: 
where 1 is positive taking into account the lag effect on output of 
monetary policy and the central bank's pre-emptive policy implemen- 
tation. 
In the Equations (9). (1 0). and (1 l),  an interaction term of the 
inflation gap and the output gap rate represents the non-linearity of 
the Phillips curve. If the Phillips curve is convex ($>0), the future 
inflation pressure c,aused by a higher output gap will turn out larger 
than in the linear case, and therefore, the central bank will react 
more strongly to a positive inflation gap than to a negative one, and, 
a s  a result, the increase in the interest rate will be larger since c4> 0. 
On the other hand, if the Phillips curve is concave (@< O), the future 
inflation pressure caused by a higher output gap will turn out smaller 
than in the linear case, and therefore, the central bank will react 
more weakly to a positive inflation gap than to a negative one, and, as 
a result, an increase in the interest rate will be smaller since c4<0. 
As the economic growth rate decrease, and, therefore, the central 
bank puts its policy weight more on economic growth in a flexible 
inflation targeting system, il in its policy objective function rises. On 
the policy efficiency frontier, if the volatility of output decreases 
beyond a certain point Vy*, then, as il increases, volatility of inflation 
increases a t  an accelerating rate, while if the volatility of inflation 
decreases beyond a certain point Vi*, then, as il decreases, the 
volatility of output increases a t  an accelerating rate. For the U.S.A., 
estimated Vi* is 2 percent (Fuhrer 1997). That means that balanced 
responses to inflation and output are important in monetary policy. 
On the other hand, if 2, rises, the values of coefficient cl and c4 
decrease. A decrease in the value of coefficient cl leads to a lower 
interest rate. 
However, in a stably or slowly growing economy, interest rates are 
already low, and, therefore, the scope for lowering interest rates tends 
to be limited. Such a situation could reduce the effectiveness of 
monetary policy. In particular, where the investment elasticity of 
interest rates is low, in such a case, the effectiveness of monetary 
policy could be severely damaged. 
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111. Empirical Analysis 
A. Data 
The Korean economy experienced a severe structural break during 
the 1997 financial crisis. In addition, in 1998 just after the crisis, an 
inflation targeting regime was adopted (Oh 1999a, 2004, and 2005). 
This means that there was a considerable policy break in 1998 as  
well. Therefore, we use two sample periods, that is, a pre-crisis period 
from the 1st quarter of 1982 to the 2nd quarter of 1997, and a 
post-crisis period from the 3rd quarter of 1998 to the 1st quarter of 
2005. The period from the 3rd quarter of 1997 to the 2nd quarter of 
1998 was excluded so as to remove the direct effects of the crisis and 
the technical rebound just after the crisis. 
Quarterly data of call rate, core price index, real GDP, nominal 
exchange rate, the import price index in terms of the U.S. dollar, the 
nominal wage rate index and the unemployment rate are used. 
Among them, real GDP, core price index, nominal exchange rate, 
import price index, nominal wage rate index and unemployment rate 
are all seasonally adjusted and then transformed into natural 
logarithms. The GDP gap rates are calculated from differences of log 
seasonally adjusted real GDP series and its log HP filtered series. The 
core inflation rate is calculated from the log difference of the 
seasonally adjusted core price index. 
Unit root tests are carried out on all data. The call rate, core 
inflation rate. GDP gap rate, log nominal wage rate index, and log 
unemployment rate have no unit root, while the log nominal exchange 
rate and log import price index show l(1) series (see unit root test 
results in Appendix Table 2), and, therefore, for those two series, first 
difference series are used for estimation. 
B. Nonlinear Phillips Curve 
As preliminary studies, reviews on existing literatures and regres- 
sion on a simple linear Phillips curve are carried out. First, according 
to a literature review of empirical studies on the Korean economy, 
estimated NAIRU and NAURI were respectively 3.2-3.7 percent in 
2003 (Shin 2004) and 2.9-3.1 percent (Lee 2002). Comparing it with 
recent actual data on the unemployment rate and core inflation rate, 
the actual unemployment rate was 3.9 percent on average from 
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Inflation Rate 
NAUN (2,9-3. 1) .. ..................... 
2.6 (05:l-8) 
Unemployment Rate 
NAIRU (3.2-3.7) 3.9 (05:l-7) 
January to July 2005, slightly higher than estimated NAIRU, and the 
actual core inflation rate was 2.6 percent on average from January to 
August 2005, lower than estimated NAURI. The recent actual core 
inflation rate is approaching to the lower bound of target range of 
core inflation, set a t  2.5-3.5 percent. 
Next, simple linear Phillips curves with core inflation rate (lncore) 
and log unemployment rate (lnun), lncore = co tcllnun, are estimated 
with an ordinary least squares method for pre-crisis period and 
post-crisis period respectively to see whether the Phillips curve 
became flatter in the stably growing post-crisis period than in the 
highly growing pre-crisis. An estimated coefficient cl for the pre-crisis 
period is -5.746, while that for the post-crisis period is -3.736. 
Accordingly, the Phillips curve seems to have become flatter in the 
post-crisis period than in the pre-crisis period and thus a degree of 
sacrifice of employment needed to reduce the inflation rate is likely to 
have increased (see Appendix Figure 2). 
In addition. in order to examine whether the Phillips curve has 
become flatter in the post-crisis period than in the pre-crisis period, 
the nonlinear Phillips curve, Equation (5) and (61, are both estimated 
for the post-crisis period and for the pre-crisis period. Estimation 
results are as set out below: 
For the post-crisis period, estimated coefficients are mostly 
statistically significant. In particular, @ is negative, that is, the 
Phillips curve is concave (@<O). Accordingly, the future inflation 
182 S E O U L  JOURNAL O F  ECONOMICS 
Incore= -3.1321 +0.8386*Incore(t- 1 )  +8.4859*Inun(t- 11 -4.3186'lnun(t- 1)' 
( -  1.2651) (12.7152) ( 1.7936) ( -  1.9810) 
RX=0.8725 D. W. = 1.3580 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics 
pressure caused by a higher output gap seems smaller than in the 
linear case. On the other hand, for the pre-crisis period, the 
coemcients estimated with the unemployment rate are statistically 
significant, while coefficients estimated with the GDP gap rate are 
statistically insignificant. As for estimation with the un-unemployment 
rate, however. @ is positive, that is, the Phillips curve is convex (#>  
0). Accordingly, the future inflation pressure caused by a higher 
output gap seems to have been larger than in the linear case. 
C. New Keynesian Model with a Nonlinear Phillips Curve 
In order to examine how a decrease in the growth rate and a 
resultant change in the Phillips curve have influenced monetary 
policy, the above new Keynesian Model composed of the central 
bank's loss function (Equation (I)), a Phillips curve (Equation (5)). an 
IS schedule (EquaUon (7)), and the central bank's policy reaction 
function (Equation (1 1)) derived from the above three functions are 
simultaneously estimated with a seemingly unrelated estimation 
method for the post-crisis period. 
In the Phillips curve, the variables of the exchange rate, import 
prices and wage rates are further added a s  cost factors, and in the IS 
schedule, a n  exchange rate variable is added in view of the high 
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dependence on exports of the Korean economy. In the policy reaction 
function, taking into account the time lags of monetary policy 
transmission and the central bank's pre-emptive policy implemen- 
tation, k and 1 are respedtively chosen to be 2 and 1 (Oh 1999b. 
2000). Here a variable of the exchange rate is also included. An 
exchange rate variable is included in many other studies on open 
economy inflation targeting models (Ball 1999; Svensson 2000; 
Clarida 2001; Taylor 2001; Mohanty and Klau 2004). In this paper, 
an  exchange rate variable is included in all three equations in view of 
the high external dependence of the Korean economy. Estimation 
results are as  in Appendix Table 1. The results of ex-post simulation 
of the model are attached in Appendix Figure 3. 
As for the Phillips curve, most coefficients are statistically 
significant and the signs of the coefficients are the same as expected. 
In particular, a s  in the above estimation of the single Phillips curve, 4 
is negative, that is, the Phillips curve is concave (@<O). 
As for the policy reaction function, all the coefficients are 
statistically significant and the signs of the coefficients are the 
same as expected except for the coefficient of an exchange rate. 
The lack of significance of the exchange rate seems due to an 
increase in the capacity for the implementation of monetary policy 
independently of exchange rates movements following the adoption 
of flexible exchange rate regime after the 1997 crisis. 
In particular, the coefficient of the interaction term of the inflation 
gap and output gap rate representing the non-linearity of the Phillips 
curve is statistically significantly negative since 4 in the Phillips curve 
is negative. In this case, the central bank tends to react more strongly 
to a negative inflation gap than to a positive one. Therefore, if the 
inflation gap is negative, in general, the output gap is also negative, 
and the interaction term itself of the inflation gap and the output gap 
is positive. Here the coefficient of the interaction term is now negative, 
and accordingly, a negative inflation gap will lead to a greater 
decrease in the interest rate of the central bank. 
The long-run Taylor rule derived from the estimated policy 
reaction function is as  follows: 
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Here a constant term 3.336 represents the long-run equilibrium 
interest rate that is the interest rate when inflation gap, output gap 
and the rate of change in the exchange rate are all zero. The 
coefficient of the inflation gap is larger than 1, and thus when the 
inflation gap is expected to be positive, the nominal interest rate 
increases more than the expected inflation gap and, as a result. the 
real interest rate remains positive. 
As for the IS schedule, the coefficient of the exchange rate is 
statistically significant and its sign is positive as expected, while the 
coefficient of the real interest rate is statistically insignificant and its 
sign is also mixed. The lack of significance of the coeMcient of the 
real interest rate seems to reflect the current low investment and 
consumption elasticity of interest rate. 
FERI is estimated for the post-crisis period using the above 
estimated Phillips curve. In this paper, the inflation rate with a zero 
GDP gap rate is assumed as FEN. Estimated FEN is slightly higher 
than the mid-point of the target core inflation rate (3 percent). but 
still within the upper bound of the target inflation range (2.5-3.5 
percent) for recent years (see Appendix Figure 4). This result is almost 
the same as in Lee (2002). 
Once FERI is estimated, it is crucial to decide an appropriate or 
optimal level of interest rate to achieve the target inflation rate. An 
appropriate interest rate level is estimated with the estimated new 
Keynesian model and FERI. The estimated appropriate level of interest 
rate seems to be slightly lower than the current rate of interest, but 
this difference is not great either (see Appendix Figure 5). 
In order to examine how much a change in target inflation rate 
influences the call rate, output gap and the inflation rate, dynamic 
simulation of the above estimated new Keynesian model was carried 
out. According to the results of the dynamic simulation, a s  the core 
inflation target increases step by step, the appropriate level of interest 
rates becomes slightly lower. Even in such a case, however, the 
output gap is scarcely influenced mainly because the demand 
elasticity of interest rates is almost negligible in the post-crisis period. 
According to the estimation results of the above new Keynesian 
model, only the coefficient of the real interest rate in the IS schedule 
is statistically insignificant and its sign is also mixed. This seems to 
reflect the recent situations of the Korean economy where there has 
been little investment in spite of a sustained decline in interest rates. 
Due to the absence of change in aggregate demand, the inflation rate 
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is not affected either. Therefore, the above dynamic simulation shows 
that, at the moment, the most important issue in the Korean economy 
seems to recover demand elasticity, in particular, the investment 
elasticity of interest rate. The level of the interest rate itself seems 
sufficiently low according to the simulation results. 
N. Summary and Conclusions 
In a stably growing economy, growing below its potential growth, a 
low growth rate tends to be accompanied by a low inflation rate and 
a low interest rate. In such an economy, compared with its high 
growth period, the Phillips curve may become flatter and, a s  a result, 
the degree of sacrifice of employment needed to bring down the 
inflation rate increases. A s  a consequence, the monetary authority 
tends to move the weight of its policy more toward economic growth 
in a flexible inflation targeting system, and the increasing weight on 
economic growth entails lower interest rate. However, in such a n  
economy, interest rates are already low, and, therefore, the scope for 
lowering them further is likely to be limited. Such a situation may 
reduce the effectiveness of monetary policy. In particular, in such a 
case where demand elasticity of interest rate is low, the effectiveness 
of monetary policy could be severely damaged. 
Accordingly, first of all, the question of how best to enhance the 
effectiveness of monetary policy even with a small change in the 
interest rate becomes an important issue. In this regard, we should 
identify which step does not work well in the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism running from short-term interest rates to 
medium and long-term interest rates, and from medium and 
long-term interest rates to final demand. And then demand elasticity, 
in particular, the investment elasticity of interest rates in such an 
economy should be raised. 
Secondly, the inflation rate is low and the growth rate is below its 
potential. Accordingly, the level of the target inflation rate should be 
carefully reexamined to restore economic growth on a path toward full 
employment. The inflation rate accompanying full employment could 
be named the Full Employment Rate of Inflation (FERI) or the 
Non-Accelerating Unemployment Rate of Inflation (NAURI). A s  the 
Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU) was often 
used as a guideline for growth in a high growth and high inflation 
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economy, FERI (or NAURI) could be one of the guidelines of the target 
inflation rate in a stably growing and low inflation economy. It is 
noteworthy that the lower bound a s  well a s  the upper bound of the 
inflation target range in a flexible inflation targeting system is 
regarded a s  important to escape from unnecessarily low growth or 
even deflation. and the resultant high unemployment. 
Thirdly, it is obviously crucial to choose the appropriate (or optimal) 
level of interest rate to achieve the target inflation rate. In this regard, 
a step by step approach with careful feedback rather than a once- 
and-for-all approach to achieve full employment a s  well a s  non- 
accelerating inflation could be recommended. 
Having enjoyed high growth before the 1997 financial crisis. the 
Korean economy is currently experiencing the new phenomenon of 
unprecedented long-term stable (or low compared with the pre-crisis 
period) growth after a severe structural break during the crisis. In 
this regard, it is even argued that the Korean economy has changed 
structurally. However, we are now observing the typical phenomena of 
a stable (or low) growth economy, including simultaneous low growth. 
low inflation, low interest rates and high asset prices in Korea. 
Consequently, studies on the relationship between inflation and 
unemployment with a nonlinear Phillips curve show that the degree of 
sacrifice of employment needed to reduce the inflation rate seems to 
be rising. Therefore, it seems desirable to conduct inflation targeting 
monetary policy more flexibly including carefully reexamining the 
target inflation rate needed to restore economic growth to a full 
employment path and the appropriate level of interest rates to achieve 
the target inflauon rate when the growth rates is expected to remain 
below the potential growth rate. However, according to the results of 
empirical studies based on a new Keynesian model, the effectiveness 
of even a flexible monetary policy would be limited mainly because of 
the extremely low demand elasticity of interest rates after the crisis. 
Therefore, a t  the moment, it is crucial, first of all, to enhance the 
effectiveness of monetary policy by raising the investment elasticity of 
interest rates. 
This paper, however, has some limitations. In particular, it does not 
include the asset market. Actually, the issue of how to incorporate 
asset price into monetary policy analysis and implementation remains 
controversial. Some argue that asset prices should be taken directly 
into account in the monetary policy, while others advocate that it be 
considered only through the price channel which asset prices 
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influence. The conventional new Keynesian model does not include 
asset prices. This question must remain as a topic for further 
research. 
(Received 14 September 2005; Revised 17 November 2005) 
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Appendix 
Policy Reaction Function 
ht=0.6069+0.2527*(1ncore(t+2) -coretargeO+O. 1280*lngdpgap(t+ 1 )  -0.0239*dlnew 
(2.5587) (5.3735) (3.3306) (-0.0165) 
R2=0.9269 D.W. = 1.9335 
Phillip Curve 
IS Curve 
Notes: 1) Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics 
2) Notations 
int: nominal call rate 
lncore: core inflation rate ((ln(core price index) - lnlcore price 
index( - 4))* 100) (%) 
coretaget: target core inflation rate (96) 
lngdpgap: gdpgap rate ((ln(gdp) - ln(HP flltered gdp)* 100) I%) 
dlnex: lnex - Inex( - 1) 
Inex: In(nominal exchange rate) 
dlnimp: Inimp - Inimp( - 1) 
lnlmp: ln(1rnport prlce index, dollar term) 
Inwage: In(wage index) 
INFLATION TARGETING IN A STABLE GROWTH ECONOMY 189 
APPENDIX TABLE 2
UNIT ROOT TEST RESULTS 










Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at  the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
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Pre-Crisis Phillips Curve 
LNCORE VS. LNUN 
LNUN 
10 
Post-Crisis Phillips Curve 
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Full Employment Rate of Inflation 
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Call Rate by Core Inflitflan Targel nfler 2000 
O r  
CDP Cap Rate by Core lnflatlon Target after 
J - 
. , b -  - - - -- - - - 
Core InflaUon Rate by Core lnflatlon Target aftrr 2003 
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